Employment: Supplemental Jurisdiction - Individual Liability

Supplemental Jurisdiction and Defendants Individual Liability

28 U.S.C. §1331 states, the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights states, “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation…of any State or Territory…causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States…of the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law….” This court can correct me, but I believe the defendants claim they are acting correctly under all statutes governing laws of discrimination, and therefore, would be acting under the color of the statues, ordinances, and regulations.

In Jones and Pressley v. Patrick and Associates Detective Agency, Inc. (7th Cir. 2006) the court reports “Pratts’ actions were within the scope of his employment. That question is governed by state law, and Illinois courts typically decide scope-of-employment issues in line with the principles outlined in the Restatement of Agency. See, e.g., Wright v. City of Danville, 675 N.E.2d 110, 118 (Ill. 1996); Pyne, 543 N.E.2d at 1308; Davila v. Yellow Cab Co., 776 N.E.2d 720, 727 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). To wit: “(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master.” Restatement §228.

In Higbee v. Sentry Insurance Co. (7th Cir. 2006) the court defined a supervisor for purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. definition of “supervisor.” See Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 2 No. 04-1502 359 F.3d 498, 506 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “a supervisor is someone with the power to directly affect the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment” (emphasis in original) (citing Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill.,Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 1998); Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2002)).

Material Facts, Disparate Treatment, Disparate Impact, Adverse Employment Action

In Farrell v. Butler University (7th Cir. 2005) the court reports when determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we consider evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Material facts are facts that “might affect the outcome of the suit” under the applicable substantive law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute over material facts is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

This court goes on to report, disparate treatment Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of sex or gender. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Claims of discrimination under Title VII for disparate treatment can be proven either through direct or indirect evidence. O’Regan v. Arbitration Forms, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir. 2001). To state a prima facie case of “disparate treatment” gender discrimination under Title VII, in the present matter, a male plaintiff must show that he: (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) is performing his job satisfactorily, (3) suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) was treated less favorably than at least one similarly-situated female colleague. Lim v. Trus. of Ind. Univ., 297 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2002); Paluck v. Gooding Rubber Co., 221 F.3d 1003, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000)

The 7th Circuit has adopted a generous definition of the phrase “adverse employment action.” See Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Haugerud v. Amery Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 678, 691 (7th Cir. 2001). In some cases, it is apparent that an employee has suffered an adverse employment action, for example, “when an employee is fired, or suffers a reduction in benefits or pay.” Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir.1996). However, “adverse job action is not limited solely to loss or reduction of pay or monetary benefits. It can encompass other forms of adversity as well.” Collins v. State of Ill., 830 F.2d 692, 703 (7th Cir. 1987).

Farrell reports under a disparate impact theory, an employer is held liable when a facially neutral employment practice disproportionately impacts members of a legally protected group.
Reidt v. County of Trempealeau, 975 F.2d 1336, 1340 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977)). Specifically, Title VII prohibits “employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.” O’Regan v. Arbitration Forms, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 986 (7th Cir. 2001) This Court has adopted a liberal standard for reviewing the scope of an EEOC charge and has held that “all claims of discrimination are cognizable that are ‘like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such allegations.’ ” Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 864 (7th Cir. 1985)

In Walker v. Abbott Laboratories (7th Cir. 2003) this court reports the Civil Rights Statutes provide two separate methods to challenge an employer’s intentional discrimination § 1981 and Title VII. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 174 n.11 (1976) (recounting that the legislative history of the Civil Right Act of 1964 reveals that Title VII and § 1981 were meant to provide alternative remedies to civil-rights violations). Section 1981 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2003). Congress did so by adding § 1981(b) to the act, which states: “For purposes of this section, the term ‘make and enforce contracts’ includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2003).

In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Supreme Court took a narrow view of the phrase “make and enforce contracts,” holding that it meant § 1981’s protections extended only to the formation of a contract and not to conduct occurring after the contract was made. 491 U.S. 164, 176-77 (1989). Congress, however, quickly responded with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which, inter alia, overruled Patterson, see H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 (II), at 2 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.S.C.A.N. 694, 695, by providing a broad definition of the phase “make and enforce contracts.” Therefore, § 1981 now prohibits discrimination in a contractual relationship beyond the mere formation of the contract. There is no dispute, however, that even as amended § 1981’s protections still center on contractual rights and that proof of a contractual relationship is necessary to establish a § 1981 claim. See Perry, 199 F.3d at 1132; Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1034.